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Summary;
Although the process of the diffusion and adoption of the steam engine by
British industry has been extensively analysed, the use of the steam engine in
America has been ignored. Yet a distinct American steam technology developed
during the first twenty ^ears of the nineteenth century and the use of steam
engines by manufacturing firms grew from four engines in 1803 to alaost 156,000 u
engines by 1900. At the same time there were pronounced regional differences in
the date when the steam engine first came to be used, in the rate at which it was
adopted and in the percentage of plants that ultimately made use of this technology.
This paper seeks to investigate the factors underlying these differences by
modeling the problem along the lines set by Griliches in his famous 1957 (Econo-
metrica) article.
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THE DIFFUSION AND ADOPTION OF THE STEAM ENGINE
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*
To T. S. Ashton (1948) the steam engine was "the pivot on which
industry swung into the modern age" in Great Britain, while more recently,
A. E. Musson (1976) claims it to be generally recognized that the intro-
duction of steam power was a crucial factor in the Industrial Revolution
in England. However in America the use of steam as a prime mover in
manufacturing has been overshadowed by its role as the prime mover in
transportation. Before the Revolution only one manufacturing estab-
lishment in America was using a steam engine (Pursell, 1969) while in
Britain perhaps as many as 130 engines were then at work (Lord, 1923).
Where manufacturers needed more power than could be supplied by muscle,
whether animal or human, the waterwheel not the steam engine appears to
have been the prime mover of choice until some time in the middle of the
last century. By 1900 however almost 156,000 steam engines were at work
in American factories where they outnumbered waterwheels and water tur-
bines by four to one (U. S. Census, 1902). This paper examines the rate
and regional pattern of steam engine diffusion in American manufacturing
during the nineteenth century and attempts to account for the increasing
demand for steam power.
The Early Use of Steam Power in America .
Prior to the improvements in engine design made by James Watt, the
steam engine was too slow and irregular to be of much use in manufacturing,
and high fuel consumption limited Its diffusion to areas blessed with
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abundant supplies of cheap fuel. Where steam engines were used in manu-
facturing they were not the prime movers but rather pumped water to supply
waterwheels. According to Lord (1923) only 20 of the 130 (Newcomen-style)
engines in use in England in 1775 were employed outside of mines and
public waterworks, while over the next: twenty-five years only 89 of the
239 engines built by Boulton and Watt were employed in mines and civil
engineering projects.
During these early years, American steam technology had no independent
existence from that in Great Britain. Most American engineers claimed
close connections with the British master engineers. Benjamin Latrobe
for example had been apprenticed to John Smeaton (Hamlin, 1955) while
James Smallman had supposedly helped install the Boulton and Watt engine
at John Wilkinson's Bradley Furnace (Latrobe, 1799). Not suprisingly,
American designs mimicked the British with varying degrees of success even
to the extent of Nicholas Roosevelt mailing his foundry and machine shop
the Soho Works after Boulton and Watt's Birmingham works.
The Revolution, however, retarded! the transfer of British technology.
Knowledge of James Watt's improvements, which did not reach the United States
until after the restoration of normal relations, did not find their way into
successful American designs until 1800 with the completion of the Schuylkill
River pumping engine for the Philadelphia waterworks by Benjamin Latrobe
and Nicholas Roosevelt (Pursell, 1969).
Consequently as of 1803 it has been claimed "not more than six engines
could be mustered in the whole of the United States" where "mechanical
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construction and skill were at least fifty years behind England" (Dickinson,
1938). This claim of Dickinson's conflicts with the account of the
Franklin Institute (1876) which noted only five engines in use in America at
that time: two in the Philadelphia waterworks, two in New York City where
one powered the city waterworks and the other was owned by Nicholas Roosevelt
and one in Eoston. But both accountings omit mention of the old recon-
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structed Hornblower engine at Roosevelt's Soho Works (Loree, 1929) and
Oliver Evans' prototype high pressure engine constructed in 1802 (Evans,
1805) . This latter event also gives lie to the claim that American tech-
nological design lagged British.
The Development and Progress of the American Steam Engine .
With the simultaneous development of the high pressure steam engine
by Richard Trevithick in Great Britain and by Oliver Evans in America,
British and American steam technologies began to diverge, particularly
with respect to the technologies as applied to stationary steam engines.
In America, the high pressure steam engine found almost universal favor.
Only 65 of the 1173 stationary steam engines for which the Woodbury Report
(1838) gives detailed statistics were of low pressure design and none
was installed west of the Appalachians. Indeed it was claimed that "low
pressure engines are not in good repute in the West" (American Railroad
Journal, 1834) . The dominance of the high pressure engine was even more
pronounced on the Western rivers (Hunter, 1949).
On the other hand, the low pressure engine was favored in Great
Britain, except in the design of locomotives, until the perfection of
the American-designed Corliss engine which effected significant fuel
economies (Dickinson, 1938) . Thus only 65 of the 240 engines in use in
Birmingham in December, 1838, were of high pressure design and these sup-
plied only one-eighth of the total horsepower (Royal Statistical Society,
1840) . This pattern was probably repeated throughout Britain.
With the exception of the Woodbury Report (1838), statistics on
steam power in America were not published until the Ninth Census which
reported both steam power and waterpower statistics (U.S. Census, 1872).
Data for this earlier period do exist but in general they must be regarded
as incomplete and subject to question regarding their reliability.
Temin (1966) claims that in 1820 there were "about a dozen" steam
engines in use while the manuscripts of the 1820 Census of Manufacturers
(National Archives, 1964) contain mention of 43 engines in use in ten
states by forty different firms and provides horsepower statistics for
sixteen of these engines. Thirteen years later, the McLane Report (1833)
shows 93 steam engines in use in manufacturing industries in eleven
states during 1831-32. By 1838, the Woodbury Report documents 1173 sta-
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tionary steam engines in manufacturing plants. It is doubtful, however,
that any of these statistics is an accurate count, or that the rate of
growth between 1833 and 1838 as rapid as implied by these figures. In
each of these sources, geographic coverage is incomplete and even when
complete, there are inexplicable anomalies between the reports.
The 1820 census made no returns, or the records were lost, for
Alabama, Arkansas, Lousiana, Michigan and Missouri. The McLane Report
omits the Southern states and those west of Ohio, while in the Woodbury
Report there are no, or only partial, returns for Alabama, Arkansas,
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Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Furthermore, the Woodbury Report listed the
number of steam engines In New York City as "about 60" and added to the
cumulative total a further 244 engines as "standing engines not returned,
but estimated". In each of these areas we know that steam engines were
operating at the time returns should have been completed.
Inconsistencies between the reports are also apparent. For example,
the McLane Report lists 25 establishments in Alleghany County Pennsylvania
as using steam power in 1832, while the Woodbury Report published five
years later notes 34 plants using steam engines built and installed by
1832. Some of the plants in the Woodbury list such as Stewart, Preston
and Co., manufacturers of steam engines, are not mentioned in the McLane
Report; others such as the tannery of John Caldwell are mentioned in the
McLane Report but no note is made of the motive power source. This picture
is further complicated by the replacement of worn-out engines during the
five year interval between the reports, for example the Hope Cotton Factory,
listed in the McLane Report as Shoenberger, Wrenshall and Company, apparently
installed a new steam engine in 1837.
Unfortunately, not only are the 1820 Census, the McLane Report and
the Woodbury Report inconsistent with one another, they are also incon-
sistent with other documentary evidence. For example both the 1820 Census
and the Woodbury Report cover Georgia yet both omit mention of a Boulton
and Watt engine imported by McAlpine and Mclnnes of Savannah in 1815
that was still working in 1894 (Button, 1894; also Engineering News, 1893).
Similarly the McLane Report makes mention of only nine steam engines in
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Cincirmati, five years later the Woodbury Report notes 18, but between
these dates it was claimed that "there are about sixty steam engines in
constant operation within the corporation lines [of Cincinnati] , exclu-
sive of those on our steamboats" (American Railroad Journal, 1834).
Although the census enumerators in 1850 and 1860 asked for details
of the motive power sources used by manufacturers, the replies were
never published. They are, however, to be found in the original census
manuscripts and we have compiled statistics for the period 1850-1870
based on a random sample from these manuscript censuses of between five
and six thousand establishments in each census year. The overlap between
the published statistics on motive power in 1870 and estimates based
on the random samples for 1870 permit us to verify our methods. The
published census reports 40,191 steam engines in use in manufacturing
industry (Ninth Census, 1872) , while based on the sample data we estimate
that there would have been 40,314 engines. The fit is very close. After
1870, the data are computed from the published census. Table 1 shows
our estimates of the regional distribution of steam engines in manufac-
turing industry between 1776 and 1900.
These data indicate the industry's rapid growth. Output of
steam engines, exclusive of replacement demand, increased at an average
rate of almost eleven percent a year from the revolution to 1900, with the
most rapid growth taking place before 1860 when it averaged 12.9 percent
per annum. From 1860 the rate of growth slowed to 4.4 percent a year.
Since it is probable that the average life of a steam engine increased
over the period, due to improved safety features, metallurgy and
Region
Table 1
The Regional Distribution of Stationary Stean Engines in Manufacturing Industry
1776 - 1900
,
fc
Number of Engines In Region
1776 1803 1820 1833A 1833B 1838 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
Bortht
New England 1 1 31 39 319 1271 3978 4329 5935 10024 14245
Middle Atlantic 3 19 43 144 546 3032 6823 12627 17490 29122 43013
South:
South IS — 116 439 1282 4418 6193 9261 16265 42252
West:
old-West 9 19 14 116 3O07 10110 16047 22087 32465 49559
Mountain and Pacific 6 248 995 1350 3514 6655
United States 1 4 43 93 313 1420 8598 25577 40191 56123 91390 155724
Regions as follovt
Rev England: CT, ME, MA, HH, KI, VT
Middle Atlantic: DE, DC, MD, HJ, KY, PA
South: AL, AR, PL, GA, NT, LA, MS, KC, SC, TN. TX, VA, WV
aid-West: IL, IK, TA, KS, KI, MH, MO, KB, ND, OR, OK, 3D, Wl
Mountain and Pacific: A2, CA, CO, ID, KT, NM, KV, OR, UT, VA, Wi
Sources
:
1776: Pursell (1969)
1803: See text
1820: National Archives (1964)
1833A: KcLane Report (1833)
1833B: Woodbury Report (1833)
1838: Woodbury Report (1838)
1850; Manuscript Census Samples
1860: Manuscript Census Samples
1870: U. S. Census (1872)
1880: Department of the Interior (1883)
1890: DeparCEent of the Interior (1895)
1900: 0. S. Census (1902)
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const:ruction and as a result of learning-by-doing by engineers and
mechanics, estimates of g^oss steam engine production would raise the
growt:h rate in the earlier years relative to the later.
The Diffusion of Steam Power .
Not only did the number of steam engines grow rapidly during the
nineteenth century but it is also clear from the data that the steam
engine gradually replaced the waterwheel and the water turbine as the
major power source in American manufacturing. In 1820 waterwheels pro-
bably outnumbered steam engines by more than 100:1 (National Archives,
1964), but by 1870 this difference had narrowed to about 5:4 (U. S.
Census 1872). By 1900 roles had been reversed with steam engines out-
numbering waterpower sources by almost 4:1 (U. S, Census, 1902). In
termfi of total horsepower produced by each source this switch from water-
power dominance to steam power dominance took place even earlier, probably
during the 1860's.
Another way of looking at this same phenomenon is to attempt to
measure the percentage of all plants that used steam and/or waterpower
that were using steam. We shall call the change over time in the propor-
tion of establishments using steam power to those using steam or water-
power the rate of diffusion. Two other articles have examined the growth
and c.evelopment of steam power, but neither has measured the rate of
diffusion. Fenichel's (1966) work is concerned with the industrial and
regional distribution of mechanical horsepowers, while Temin's (1966)
analysis also covers the industrial and regional distribution of steam
power but is much more time specific than Fenichel's, referring only
to the period about 1838.
Over time, more and more plants come to use more than one prime
mover, so that the data in Table 1 over-estimates the number of plants
actually using steam power. For example, as early as 1820, two plants,
the Columbian Iron Foundry and Steam Engine Manufactory of New York and
the Altena Iron Works of Pittsburgh, each used two engines (National
Archives, 1964). Similarly in 1900 the Twelfth Census (1902) shows that
in Pennsylvania 17,334 establishments reported using inanimate power
sources but that there were 20,955 steam engines in use. We therefore
tried to convert the data in Table 1 into estimates of the number of
establishments using steam by correcting for the double counting. If
these estimates are expressed as the percentage of steam-powered plants
to steam and water powered plants and plotted on a graph there emerges,
to a greater or lesser extent, a crude approximation of the familiar
S-shaped growth curve similar to those often noted in connection with
the diffusion of a new technology (Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1961).
The S-shape trend may be approximated by a number of functions, the
two most popular of which are the cumulative normal and the logistics
curve. Because of the difficulty of working with the cumulative normal
distribution, the logistics curve is usually preferred. The logistics
form is used here to approximate the trend in the diffusion of steam
power
.
The logistics curve is defined by
P = K/(l + e
~ (a+bt)
) [1]
where P_ is the percentage of plants using steam power, jC is the ceiling
rate or the maximum percentage of plants that will ever use steam power,
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jt is the time variable, _b is the rate of growth coefficient and a_ is the
constant of integration that positions the logistics growth curve on the
time scale (Griliches, 1957). This expression, however, is clear dif-
ficult to estimate and so it is usually transformed into a linear function
in a_ and b^ that can be estimated by ordinary least squares. The trans-
formation is accomplished by dividing both sides of [1] by (K - P) and
taking the natural logarithm. The result is that we estimate the equation
Log
e
[P/(K - P)] - a + bt [2]
Estimates of equation [2], as applied to the data in Table 1 expressed
as a percentage of all plants using steam or waterpower, produced the
results shown in Table 2 and the curves shown in Figures 1 and 2. Ceiling
rates were estimated by projecting an asymptotic line from the S-shaped
growth curves derived from the data in Table 1. Subsequent tests showed
2
that these estimates also maximized the R of the logistics functions
even though this was not the selection criterion. Notwithstanding the
imperfections in the raw data and the limited number of observations,
the logistics curve fit is remarkably good in every case as shown by the
2high r_ . Time is measured from 1820 and the estimate,
"
i
origin - (-2.197 - a)/b
represents the number of years from this base date when the function
achieved ten percent of its maximum value. Griliches (1957) terms this
measure the date of origin of the development. Rates of adoption, b,
that is the slope of the transform are highest in the West and lowest
in the Northeast. Estimates of the ceiling, K, are similar and correspond
to prior expectations, being lowest in New England where waterpower was
-11-
Table 2
Steam Power Logistic Trend Functions by Regions'
Region b cCeiling Rate of Adoption
K b
Date when 10% of
ceiling have already
adopted
North:
New England
Middle Atlantic
,55
J5
.074
.051
1838.005
1829. 424
.944
.925
South:
South .80 .080 1838.404 .961
West:
Mid-west . 98
Mountain and Pacific .94
.087
.084
1832.130
1840.645
.990
.961
The United States .80 .071 1832.418 ,976
a
log
e
[P/(K - P)] = a + b«t; t182Q =
Ceiling = K, estimated using data in Table 1. See text.
Rate of Adoption Slope = b. All are significantly greater than zero at the five percent
level.
T>ate » Origin + 1820 - [(-2.197 - a)/b + 1820]. See Griliches (1957).
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extenaively developed but where coal reserves were absent and highest
in the Mid-west which lacks a Fall Line but does have abundant coal
reserves.
Using this method we can then "explain" the pace and pattern of
the diffusion of the steam engine if we can provide a rational explanation
for the origin, slope and ceiling of the logistic estimates. Following
Griliches' (1957) lead, we will consider each parameter separately though
as the analysis will show there is good reason for believing that they
may be interdependent. Variations in the date of origin when the trans-
form achieves ten percent of its maximum value will be identified with
factors affecting the supply side; variations in the slope are identified
with factors affecting the rate of acceptance of steam power that is
primarily demand factors and variations in the ceiling rates with demand
factors affecting the long-run equilibrium position. This is the same
division proposed by Griliches (1957) but the analysis differs from that
of the diffusion of hybrid corn in a number of important respects. First,
we are dealing with a period for which there is and was very limited and
patchy information. Second, the adoption of the steam engine was a gradual
process particularly when compared with more recent innovations much as
hybrid corn (Griliches, 1957) or the deisel locomotive (Mansfield, 1961
and 1963). Third, because the rate of adoption was so slow, the diffusion
period is one of great change both in steam technonogy itself and also
among potential users. Lastly, the degrees of freedom in our analysis
are quite limited. Each of these factors handicaps and complicates the
analysis.
-15-
The Supply of Steam Engines .
Although the successful completion of the Philadelphia waterworks
in 1800 may be regarded as signalling the availability of reliable, do-
mestically-designed steam engines, it is the publication in 1805 of The
Abortion of the Young Steam Engineer's Guide by Oliver Evans that places
the power of steam at almost anybody's command, for this bock provided
for the first time a detailed outline of the construction methods and
operating principles of the high pressure engine. It provided skilled
engineers sufficient information to duplicate Evans' patented engine
design and they did. Evans sued to protect his patent rights but the-:
courts rejected. his claims in 1809 (Purseli, 1969). From this date, then,
the basic steam engine technology was freely available to all without
threat of legal action. However that is not to imply that supply was :
perfectly elastic after 1809 and that steam engines were uniformly avail-
able throughout the country. Theoretical availability has relatively
little to do with the date when a potential user could actually take
delivery of an engine.
There is no way of identifying a "beginning" from the logistics
curves because they approach zero asymtotically. Therefore an alternative
means of estimating the date when an invention becomes generally available
is that suggested by Griliches (1957). The origin ( - [-2.197 - a]/b)
represents the date when ten percent of the ceiling rate of users have
already adopted the new technology. For the steam engine to achieve this
level' of adoptions it must have satisfied such criteria as availability,
cost effectiveness, reliability and peer group recommendations.. At the
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statistically defined origin the density of actual users varied from
as little as one plant in twenty in New England to one plant in ten in
the Mid-west. It seems probable that at these density levels all manu-
facturers had at least a passing acquaintence with the steam engine.
Availability largely reflects the decisions of the engine builders.
Distances in the United States are great and the transportation network
of the 1820's and 1830's was imperfectly developed. Remoteness then from
a source of supply should retard steam engine availability. We would
also expect that engine-makers would attempt first to satisfy those
markets with the strongest actual or potential demand as the expected
profitability in these markets should be the greatest, ceteris paribus .
The decision to satisfy the market demand may, however, also involve a
decision to relocate closer to the market. Since engineering skill and
experience with steam engines was a scarce commodity, areas where these
skills were relatively more abundant should be more attractive as bases
of operation.
As befits its leadership role in the development of steam technology,
the steam engine was available soonest in the Middle Atlantic states and
from there it spread out in a wave-like movement to the North, South and
West. Indeed, an apt simile would be to liken Pittsburgh or Philadelphia
to the center of a spreading series of waves on the quiet surface of a
pond. Neither city had a decisive leadership over the other in steam
technology during the 1830's, for the Woodbury Report (1839) credits each
city with 44 engine makers. Prior to the 1830's, Philadelphia probably
led but by the 1850 's Pittsburgh was the clear leader.
-17-
We can offer no clear reason why Pittsburgh replaced Philadelphia
except to observe that Pittsburgh was much closer to the major steam
engine market, the Mid-west, and that it became the home of many of the
leading engine-makers such as Mahlon Rodgers, John Arthur and McClung,
Pratt and Wade.
The wave simile seems particularly apt in this context. If we
regard the Pittsburgh-Philadelphia axis as the center of engine-building
in the United States, then the time taken for the wave to reach point A
is a function of the distance, X- , between point A and that axis. We
have estimated a function describing this time path. Measuring the
straight-line distances between the centroid of the axis and the major
population centers of each region in the 1830* s, namely Boston, New York,
New Orleans and Cincinnati, yields a crude approximation of these dis-
tances. In the absence of any large scale American (as opposed to
Spanish) settlement in the Mountain and Pacific states as early as the
1830' s, we have used the western frontier of settlement as a proxy for
4
the distance from the Pittsburgh-Philadelphia axis to this region.
Using these distances we were able to estimate the following regression
equation:
Date when 10% of Ceiling
Level have Adopted = 1829.473 + 0.010 • X. [3]
• (t-statistic) (3.338) (2.521)
R
2
• .572 n =5
which suggests that each 100 miles of distance from the Pittsburgh-
Philadelphia machine shops delayed steam engine availability by about
a year. Adding a dummy variable into equation [3] to represent location
-18-
on the Western rivers did not improve the fit of the equation by sufficient
to offset the loss of an additional degree of freedom. However, the co-
efficient of the dummy variable had the expected sign-negative—indicating
that the relative ease of communications speeded up the steam engine avail-
ability.
A second variable which might be expected to influence the avail-
ability of steam engines in a particular location, is the engine supplier's
expectations regarding the likely rate of adoptions. The greater the
slope of the logistic curve transform, b, the more rapidly a region
approached its ceiling level of adoptions and, ceteris paribus , the more
engines would be demanded from suppliers per unit of time. Once the
level of adoptions approached the ceiling level, the growth in the demand
for steam engines approached the rate of growth of manufacturing industry
in the region and steam engine-making ceased to be a growth industry.
Thus one would expect on the basis of this argument that there exists
an inverse correlation between the date of origin and the expected rate
of adoption as approximated by the actual rate of adoption, b.
On the other hand one can also make a plausible argument for a
positive correlation between these two on the basis of the latecomer
hypothesis. That is, the late developing region has the ability to
adopt the best practice technique by drawing on the experience of the
earlier developing regions. Thus if at the jt water were cheaper than
steam, while at time (t+1) the reverse were true, we would expect that
the region developing at time (t+1) would adopt steam more rapidly than
the region which began to develop at time t_. A priori therefore we have
-19-
no firm expectations about the sign of extent of the relationship
between the date of origin and b.
Other factors affecting supply-side response are less easily
measured because of the limited availability of data. Consequently
we have been forced to use less satisfactory data obtained for later
periods to explain the supply response in the 1830* s.
Whenever it is impossible to satisfy all markets simultaneously,
then the rational supplier will be most interested in the market with
the largest relative excess demand because the rise in market price will
be greatest there. Relative excess demand depends not only upon the
regional share of manufacturing industry but also upon the fraction of
those plants that are expected to want to adopt the steam engine, that
is upon the ceiling rates. We have defined a variable, relative share
of manufacturing, X„ = (Firms In the Region/Firms in the United States
at the same date) x K, the ceiling rate for the region. While we should
have liked to have estimated X- for the 1830' s, lack of information made
it impossible leading us to rely upon estimates derived from the 1850
census of manufacturing (U. S. Congress, 1859). However, it is doubtful
that rankings based on 1850 data would have differed from those which
would have been obtained had 1830' s data been available. The Middle
Atlantic states had the largest number of firms followed by New England,
the South, the Mid-west and the Mountain and Pacific states in that
order. Weighting by ceiling rates changed this order considerably to
the Middle Atlantic states, the Mid-west, the South, New England and
the Mountain and Pacific states a very distant last.
-20-
The strength of the excess demand is, however, only one of the
factors that will affect the decision to enter the market. Another
important factor is likely to be the availability of fuel supplies and
their importance relative to substitute power sources which would compete
with steam. Supplies of cheap fuel, coal or wood, were essential to the
success of the steam engine particularly since transportation facilities
were poor and expensive and fuel consumption per horsepower per hour was
high during the early nineteenth century. Although wood could be substi-
tuted for coal, coal was the preferred fuel because of its higher value-
to-weight ratio in transportation and its higher thermal value as a fuel.
But it is not just the availability of fuel that determines the
decision to supply the market with engines. Competition from waterpower
must also be considered, Unfortunately the earliest survey of waterpower
potential made in connection with the 1880 Census is incomplete, neglecting
consideration of any rivers west of the Red River of the North. This could
be used as an argument for denying any importance to the waterpower poten-
tial of the Mountain and Pacific states at least in so far as it was per-
ceived by the economic decision maker in the early nineteenth century.
However, it is doubtful whether anyone reading or hearing about the Lewis
and Clark expedition could remain unaware of the considerable waterpower
potential of the West.
Because of the visibility of waterpower potential in the streams
and rivers across the country and because most of the coal reserves were
buried, unknown and unmined (particularly the extensive western reserves)
we have defined the variable X_, relative fuel supply, as the ratio of
-21-
the fraction of national fossil fuel production mined in the region to
the fraction of the national hydraulic power potential available in
the region. This variable then measures the intensity of the fuel supply
relative to competing sources. Our estimates of fossil fuel production
are derived from the 1850 Census (U. S. Congress, 1859) while the esti-
mates of the waterpower potential are derived from Federal Power Commi-
sion (1968) studies.
The early steam engines were often built on site rather than at a
central manufactory. Purchasers contracted with the engine-maker for
a crew of skilled engineers, engine blueprints and perhaps some critical
components but much of the engine hardware was obtained locally (Pursell,
1969) . This system made rigid quality control impossible and led to
great variations in the performance of supposedly identical engines.
The desire to improve quality control led to the decline in the practice
of on-site construction in favor of factory production. However because
transportation facilities were generally poor, the decision to supply
a particular market often involved the joint decision to locate a manu-
facturing plant in the same area. It was this, for example, that led
Oliver Evans to have a factory in Pittsburgh in addition to his Mars
Works in Philadelphia. One was supposed to serve the western markets
and one was to serve the east coast.
However engineering skill and steam engine experience were rela-
tively scarce and there was a strong incentive for the would-be supplier
to locate in regions where these were most plentiful. We have assumed
that the employees of machine shops would have the necessary basic
-22-
engineering skills and that at least one person in each plant that used
a steam engine would be at least familiar with the design and operating
principals involved. The variable X
; ,
engineering expertise, is defined
as the number of persons with engineering skill or contact with steam
power per 1000 manufacturing employees. From our argument we would ex-
pect that the greater the density of engineers and steam engine operators
the earlier the steam engine would be made available.
A regression equation incorporating this independent variable
yielded the estimate:
Date when 10% of Ceiling
Level have Adopted = 1825.555 - 0.152X,
(t-statistic) (5.662) (-2.304)
n - 5 R
2
= 0.518
which implies that an increase in density of one person per thousand
with engineering expertise would have reduced the date at which steam
was made available by about two months. However, it should be noted
that the coefficient of X, in equation [4] is significant only at the
twenty percent level.
With only five observations, the results must be regarded with
some scepticism and interpreted with caution. Moreover, some of the
independent variables which we have suggested, such as the relative fuel
supply, are difficult to interpret in a regression equation. Therefore,
the results of the supply analysis relating the date at which ten per-
cent of the ceiling level have adopted steam to the various factors
discussed above are represented by correlation coefficients as shown
in Table 3. This method of presentation has the advantage insofar as
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix of Factors Affecting the Date of Steam Engine
Availability
Variable 2^ b X
2
X- X
.824
*1
b
*2
h
,602 -,954 -.837 -.799
.532 -.753 -.826 -.775
-.728 -.910 -.045
.881 .640
.441
i Date of Origin. The date when ten percent of the ceiling rate of
adopters are using the steam engine. See Table 2.
X, Approximate straight-line distance from Pittsburgh to the major regional
population centers. See text.
b =* Rate of adoptions. The slope of the logistic curve transform. See Table 2.
X
?
= Relative share of manufacturing in 1850 corrected for differences in ceiling
rates of adoption. See text and Table 2.
X_ = Relative fuel supply. (Regional coal production 1850)/(Waterpower
Potential, 1968). See text.
X, Engineering Expertice. [(Employees of Machine Shops + Number of firms x
.
.
Fraction adopting the Steam Engine) /(All Manufacturing Employees)] x 1000.
See text.
01/01/78
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it does not per se imply causality although we have argued above for
the relationship running in a particular direction, namely from those
various factors such as distance to the date of origin. The relationship
between the date of origin and the other (independent) variables is
usually stronger than the relationships between these other (independent)
variables. Moreover with the exception of the rate of adoption, all
signs are as expected. Distance from the Pittsburgh-Philadelphia axis
as shown in both equation [3] and Table 3 is positively related to the
date at which the steam engine becomes available in each region. On
the other hand, relative shares of manufacturing, relative fuel supply
and engineering expertise (X„, X_, and X.) are all regatively corre-
lated with date of availability indicating that the higher their value
the sooner the steam engine was made available. The correlation between
the date of origin and b proved to be positive which would be consistent
with the latecomer hypothesis rather than viewing b as a measure of the
expected rate of adoptions. At the same time this correlation coeffi-
cient is statistically not significantly different from zero at the five
percent level.
Other factors also complicate the results presented in Table 3.
Among other things, the use of the linear hypothesis presupposes a con-
tinuous, linear relationship and accurate measurement of the variables.
If we allow the possibility of measurement error that does not alter
rankings or the possibility of non-linearities then a non-parametric test
might be preferable. With the exception of the rank correlation between
the date of origin and b, the rate of adoption, the Spearman coefficients
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of rank correlation between the date of origin and the variables X. - X,
were all significant at better than the five percent level* These re-
sults thus are comparable with the parametric results in Table 3.
The long-run supply of steam engines during the nineteenth century
was apparently very elastic. Despite the very rapid growth in the number
of steam engines demanded, the available evidence suggests that price
declined by, perhaps, $1.50 per horsepower per year from about $125 per
horsepower in the 1820's (U. S. Congress, 1837-38) to about $40 a horse-
power by the 1880's (Manning (1889); Main (1890)). We can therefore
conclude that the long-run industry supply curve for steam engines was
downward sloping.
The Rate of Adoption .
To the extent to which we have identified variations in the date of
origin with supply factors and variations in the rate of adoption with
demand factors, the results in Table 3 are consistent with economic theory.
This is true also of the correlation between the date of origin and b_,
the rate of adoption. Suppliers and consumers are usually different sets
of decision makers, and therefore supply is regarded as independent of
demand in neo-classical theory. This is also true here. While engine
builders were also typically engine users (if only to demonstrate the
product and their faith in it) , the intersection between suppliers and
consumers was not large as engine makers never representing more than
about five percent of the potential users.
Although the decision to adopt a new technology depends upon a
large number of factors, only a few of which can be measured, the dominant
-26-
factor in the decision is likely to be the profitability of switching
from the existing technology to the new. "Profitability" here is defined
as the difference in per horsepower costs between steam power and
waterpower adjusted for productivity differences between the two. Our
estimates of profitability are based on the capital budgeting model.
Consider two mutually exclusive projects, W and S, each with a life
of n_ years in which annual costs of C(W) and C(S) are incurred, then the
capital budgeting model would lead to the selection of that project with
the lowest present value of future costs. That is, if
pv(s) = ££& • i L_<f*v(w) = £W . ± _ i ts]
r
(1 + r)
n ^ r (1 + r)n
where r is the rate of discount, then project S would be selected in pre-
ference to project W.
Our estimates of PV(S) and PV(W) are made over the period 1830-1890
(n = 60) as this is the period when the steam engine wins acceptance rising
from ten percent of the ceiling value (that is, the date of origin) to
ninety percent of the ceiling value from which point the asymptotic nature
of the logistic curve becomes quite pronounced. Crudely speaking, this
is the period that, in conjunction with the ceiling rate, defines b_, the
rate of adoption.
However this seemingly simple definition hides a number of very
serious conceptual and empirical difficulties. Before discussing these,
let us first define the costs C(W) and C(S). Costs of waterpower include
not only the capital charges against the cost of the wheel and gearing
and the cost of a wheelman, but also the purchase of water rights and
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other miscellaneous expenses such as repairs, maintenance and insuranc
Costs of steam power include capital charges against the cost of the e„ ._
boilers and foundations, the cost of fuel and labor charges for an engineer
and fireman together with miscellaneous costs similar to those for water-
power. Explicitly,
C(W) - WHEEL • (INT + DEPRC(W) + REP(W) 4- INS(W)>
+ (WATER/EFF) + WAGE • DAYS(W)
and
where
:
[6]
C(S) = ENG • (INT + DEPRC(S) + REP(S) + INS(S))
+ FUELCON • COALP • DAYS(S) • HOURS [7]
+ 2.0 WAGE • DAYS(S)
C(W) * Cost of Water Power per Horsepower,
C(S) = Cost of Steam Power per Horsepower,
INT = Rate of Interest (discount),
DEPRC(W), DEPRC(S) = Depreciation Rate on Waterwheel or Steam
Engine, Straight-line, no scrap value,
REP(W), REP(S) = Repair rate for Waterwheel or Steam Engine as
a percent of original cost,
INS(W), INS(S) = Insurance Rate on original cost of Waterwheel
or Steam Engine,
DAYS(W), DAYS(S) = Days of Operation per year for Water powered or
Steam powered plant,
WAGE = Daily wage (semi-skilled) per horsepower,
WHEEL Original cost of Waterwheel, years, fore bays, etc., per
horsepower,
WATER = Annual cost of Water-right capable of producing one
theoretical horsepower (* (Flow of Water (cubic ft./min) •
height of Fall (ft.) • Weight of One Cubic ft. of water
(lbs) )/3 3000),
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EFF = Design efficiency of Waterwheel, (Realized/Theoretical)
horsepower,
ENG = Original cost of Steam Engine, boilers, etc., per horsepower,
FUELCON Coal consumption, pounds/hour/horsepower,
COALP 3 Bituminous coal price, per pound,
HOURS = Average daily hours of operation.
These variables, however, are not single-valued. Rather they are
uncertain and subject to both random and systemmatic fluctuations. They
may al«o be subject to measurement error and in some cases even the most
rudimentary kind of information about the variable cannot be found in the
literature. Thus the uncertainty has two dimensions, historical uncer-
tainty faced by the decision-makers and uncertainty faced by current
researchers. In order to take account of these uncertainties, we have
resorted to Monte Carlo sampling methods to derive our present value
estimates, the full nature of which is described elsewhere (Atack, 1978).
The sinulation explicitly recognizes both random and systematic fluctua-
tions and tries to extract the maximum possible information from the
often very limited observations of particular variables. Data was drawn
from the available sources for each region and decade and it is on these
that the simulation estimates are based. For the most part, some infor-
mation about the probable range of values a variable might take and the
average or model value was sufficient for the simulation model which
imposed minimal constraints upon the input probability distributions.
The results, especially estimates of the annual costs, C(W) and
C(S), appear reasonable and are in many cases remarkably close to esti-
mates made by contemporaries for similarity located plants. However,
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because of the inherent problems In predicting expectations, the results
should be treated as ex post rationalizations for the pace of steam
engine adoptions and a true explanation of the pattern only to the extent
to which actual trends in the variables after 1830 could have been pre-
dicted by trends prior to that date.
The simulation approach was necessary from yet another standpoint.
The available evidence casts doubt upon the degree to which the random
variation in the variables approximated a normal distribution. Our
simulation procedure explicitly allows for no fewer than six distribution
types: normal, exponential, gamma, beta, Weibull and uniform, together
with left and right skews in the beta and Weibull distributions. The
characteristics of these distributions are described in Naylor (1966)
.
The output distribution of the present values cannot then be predicted
ex ante since it is the result of sums, products and dividends of a
variety of different distributions and these change through time. All
variables with the exception of insurance rates are assumed to be random
variables. The decision to treat insurance rates as a constant for each
power source and decade reflects the widespread and general quotation
of rates which more closely approximates our notion of perfect competi-
tion. Certainly the industry was among the first to collect and analyze
data on a systematic basis. We assume that the uncertainty affected
the insurance company rather than the insured and that the rates charged
for water and steam powered plants reflected the risks involved.
One additional factor complicates the analysis and must be treated
here. Available evidence suggests that waterwheels were longer lived
than steam engines (U. S. Congress (1837-38); Manning (1889); Main (1890)),
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so that the 11 in Equation [5] is different for water and steam. Because
present values can only be compared over the same periods, some adjustment
is necessary. Suppose that steam engines have an expected life of ten
years, while waterwheels have an expected life of 20 years, then over the
period 1830-1899, the steam engine would be due for replacement in 1840,
1850, 1860, 1970 and 1880 while the waterwheel would be replaced in 1850
and 1870. Thus the question would be whether
£PV(S) *> EPV(W) [8]
where
1 - 1 + 1V(W) - C(W) 1830 •
rl830
.
C(W) 1850 •
.
•
r1850
•
C(W)
1870
r1870
fl -L. N 20 ft J. N 20(1 + r1830) (1 + r1830)
1 -
a \ 20 ri j. \**°(1+r1850 ) (1+r1830 )
1 ~ 1 [9]
<1+r1870)2
°
and EPV(S) is similarly defined. The term C ^W) 1850 • 1 - 1
r
1850 (1 + r)
20
in equation [9] is the present value of the costs of the waterwheel that
is purchased in 1850 at 1850 discount rates. This is then discounted back
1
to 1830 at the 1830 discount rate by the term
,- .20
(1 + r1830 )
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A sinilar set of equations may be defined for any life spans of steam
engines and waterwheels. Finally it should be clear that certain values
are identical between steam power and waterpower, most notably the rate
of interest and the wage rate. Thus, we assume that there is no skill
difference between those overseeing the operations of steam engines and
thos** watching overr the waterwheels or turbines that is not accounted
for by our attributing two full-time employees per steam engine and
only one full-time employee per waterwheel* Even if this assumption is
in error, it would have to be a dramatic change to reverse any conclu-
sions and relationships. The same is also true of the other variables.
All other variables are assumed to be independent of one another even
though one might make a very plausible argument that prices were demand
detejrmined and thus at least partially endogenous to the model rather
than exogenous. A case in point would be water-rights. While their
pric<s may have been determined by the demand for water power and the
demand for water power relative to steam power, it does seem that the
price of most water-rights were set by long-term contract and subject
to little, if any, change?
Some of the results of this simulation approach are shown in Table 4.
These figures represent estimates of the difference in the present value
of the cost of steam power and waterpower per horsepower, where a negative
sign indicates that steam is cheaper than water, together with estimates
of the probability that steam will be cheaper than water over the period
1830-1890. According to these estimates it is most profitable to adopt
steam power in the Mid-west where it was extremely unlikely that waterpower
-32-
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would be cheaper, while waterpower was relatively much less expensive
than steam in New England where the probability that steam would have
been cheaper was less than .36. This accords with our ex ante expectations
and is generally confirmed by the debate over the relative merits of
steam power versus waterpower that was carried on during the antebellum
period. Pro-steam supporters were mainly from the Mid-west and South,
while the pro-water faction was heavily concentrated in New England
(DeBow (1848), (1849), (1850a), (1850b), (1850c), (1853); Merchant
Magazine (1849); James (1849); Smith (1850)). The present value of
steam power costs are also given for reference purposes but it should
be noted that
Mean PV(S) - Mean (PV(S) - PV(W)) f Mean PV(W)
since in estimating Mean (PV(S) - PV(W)) not all variables are indepen-
dent between PV(S) and PV(W).
Although not shown, the ranking in these results is not changed by
variations in the life of the asset. The longer the life of both steam
engines and waterwheels, the lower the costs and the relatively cheaper
steam becomes vis _a vis waterpower provided there is no change in the life
of a steam engine relative to that of a waterwheel. A detailed sensiti-
vity analysis is performed in Atack (1978)
.
Our a_ priori expectation is that the rate of adoption will correlate
highly with the estimated profitability of adopting the steam engine in
preference to the waterwheel. The greater the profitability of the change-
over the faster we would expect the response to be, even in the presence
of imperfect knowledge, as the greater the difference the more apparent
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any cost saving should be. Because ''profitability" is defined here in terms
of cost differences where a negative sign indicates that steam power was
cheaper than waterpower, the correlation, if present, should be negative.
The rates of adoption, however, depend upon the ceiling rates, K,
as shown in Equation [1] and since we want to provide a separate expla-
nation for D, it is desireable to remove the influence of K from the
estimates of _b. This is done by estimating b' = b • K (Griliches, 1957).
Furthermore this procedure translates Jb back into percentage units rather
than percentage of ceiling values, reflecting the opinion that given two
equally rapid rates of adoption, jb, the one yielding the higher ceiling
value is the more important of the two, at least on a ragional basis.
The correlation between b' and [PV(S) - PV(W)] was estimated at
-.786 for the 1830-1890 interval indicating a fairly strong relationship
between adjusted rates of adoption and our estimates of the profitability
of changing from water to steam power. The greater the profitability
of the switch, the faster entrepreneurs were to make that change. This,
of course, is precisely what economic theory would predict.
Expected value however is not the sole decision criterion when
evaluating a risky investment opportunity, the rational investor also
takes into account the probability that the investment will be profitable.
This proposition is central to the theory of finance. For example con-
sider two separate investment opportunities. Option (1) offers a gain
of $1000 with a possibility of 0.1 and 0.9 chance of breaking even.
Option (2) offers the possibility of gaining $1000 with a probability
of 0.55 or a loss of $1000 with probability 0.45. Both have the same
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expected value of $1000, but the loss with Option (1) is much lower than
Option (2) and the variability of the expected return is also much lower.
The risk averse investor would thus prefer Option (1) to Option (2).
Assuming risk averse behavior we would expect that the higher the possi-
bility that steam power would be cheaper than waterpower, the faster
steam would be adopted. This is true of the relationship in Table 4,
although the correlation between P(PC(S) < PV(W)) and b* is low (0.555)
and is not statistically significant.
One major factor that may account for these relatively low correla-
tions is the uncertainty surrounding the basic data in our simulations
for the earlier decades, particularly for the 1830' s and 1840' s. We
would therefore expect the results to Improve as we estimated the present
value of the costs for later time periods as the quality and quantity of
data improve. Because of the constraint imposed by our having available
only data for the period 1830-1899, these later time periods were also
necessarily shorter time periods. The simple correlation between b*,
the adjusted rate of adoption and the profitability of adopting steam
over water or the probability that steam will be cheaper than water when
these runs were made showed a marked and pronounced improvement as the
simulation model used data which are historically better documented and
probably more accurately reflect the true costs and the range of their
variation at that time. The dramatic improvement in the explanatory
power of the profitability variable or the probability variable was
particularly evident for the periods 1840' s to 1890 's onwards and were
significant at better than the five percent level. Thus for example
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the correlation coefficient between the adjusted rate of adoption, b',
and the Mean (PV(S) - PV(W)) was -0.911 for the period 1860's to 1890's
and between b' and the probability, P(PV(S) < PV(W)), for the same period
the correlation coefficient was 0.956. The results were thus internally
consistent and corresponded with our expectations from economic theory.
The Equilibrium Level of Use .
By the 1890's almost all potential adopters of the steam engine
had made the switch in each region as shown by the graphs in Figure 1.
From this time on, the number of new users approaches the number of
new firms entering the industrial scene. Further growth in the diffu-
sion and adoption of the steam engine was also slowed by the emergence
of new competition. The alternate power sources were no longer water
or steam for entering the market were two new powerful prime movers
that combined most of steam's advantages (e.g., freedom of location,
and the multiplication of power sources within a plant) . These new
rivals of steam were the internal combustion engine and the electric
motor, both of which were destined, like steam, to revolutionize pro-
duction methods and ultimately replace steam as the prime mover of
American industry. The 1890's then represent the watershed for steam
power.
Although ceiling rates, K, and the rates of adoption, b, are
closely related and expected to be functions of essentially the same
variables, there is a subtle distinction between the two. We have
argued that the rate of adoption is determined by the capital budgeting
decision, that is, an analysis of the expected costs over the period
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of adoption and the life of the asset, taking into account risk and
recontracting possibilities. On the other hand, while it is unlikely
that the ceiling rates would be independent of the profitability of
adopting steam over water, it is more logical to argue that the correct
profit estimates affecting the ceiling rates are not the expected pro-
fits at some earlier period when adoption of steam is still undecided
but rather the focus should be upon the expected profits over the life
of the asset at a period when the ceiling rate has been attained or
is clearly visible, That period is the decade of the 1890 *s.
Because of the attenuation of K by the restriction that max K 1.00,
Griliches (195?) has suggested replacing K by the logistic transform
Logit K log [K/ (i ~ K)
]
, We have made this transformation.
Our simulation estimates of Mean[PV(S) - PV(W)], the present value
of the difference in costs during the 1890 ? s, together with the associated
probability estimates that steam power would be cheaper than waterpower
are shown in Table 5. Steam power was estimated to be relatively most
profitable in the Mid-west and least profitable in New England, but rela-
tive costs generally declined in the North and rose in the West over the
period 1830-1899.
Correlations between the estimates in Table 5 and logit K were quite
high and have the expected signs. The correlation coefficient between
logit K and Mean[PV(S) - PV(W)] was -,802 indicating that the relatively
cheaper steam was vis a_ vis water the higher the ceiling rate of adoptions
for steam. Similarly the greater the probability that steam would be
cheaper than water, the higher the ceiling rate of adoptions. This corre-
lation coefficient was 0.811.
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Table 5
Present Value of the Difference in the Cost of Steam Power
And Waterpower During the 1890* s and the Probability that
Steam will be Cheaper than Water
Region Mean [PV(S) - PV(W)] P[PV(S) < PV(W)]
1890'
s
1890»s
North:
New England $ 5.30 .47
Middle Atlantic 1.31 .48
South:
South -81.36 .73
West:
mid-West -206.69 .99
Mountain and Pacific -25.49 .59
Simple Correlation with
Logit K
a
-0.802 0.811
a
Logit K = log (K/(l-K))
Source: Simulation model.
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Conclusion .
Although this analysis does not "explain" the diffusion of steam
power and the replacement of water as the prime mover of American industry,
it does show that the observed behavior by both suppliers of steam
engines and would-be users corresponds to the pattern expected from pro-
fit-maximizing entrepreneurs under conditions of uncertainty. The steam
engine was most rapidly adopted and achieved its highest level of use in
the Mid-west where its superiority over water was most pronounced , and by
the same token the rate of adoption was slowest and the ultimate level of
acceptance lowest in the area where its superiority was least, that is
in New England, Suppliers also appear to have recognized this and con-
centrated their efforts upon the markets most likely to adopt and most
o
profitable when they do adopt* These supply and demand relationships
underlying the logistics analysis are strong and statistically significant,
generally at better than the ten percent level.
The demand side explanations of the rate of adoptions and the
ceiling levels depend heavily upon the results of the simulation model
and while one might debate the historical veracity and reasonableness
of some of the assumptions in the model it must be emphasized that the
annual cost estimates of steam and water power from this model compare
most favorably with the scattered estimates made by contemporaries. This
is particularly true of the steam power cost estimates. For example,
contemporary estimates made by Charles T» James, one-time superintendent
of the Slater cotton mill, and reprinted in De Bow's Review throughout
the 184Q's and 1850 J s suggest a range of costs of $45.77-$105.33 per
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9horsepower for steam under favorable conditions (i.e., close to a
coalfield) while in the Mid-west, the simulation model produced a ninety-
five percent confidence interval estimate of ($51.93, $121.95) for the
1840's and ($45.58, $122.66) for the 1850's. The simulation estimates
for water power costs were not as close to the contemporary estimates.
However, the background of the majority of pro-water power supporters
leads one to suspect that their estimates may be more biased than those
made by the pro-steam faction. For example, water power costs in the
1840' s in the New England area were estimated by contemporaries to be in
the range $23.33-50.00, while the ninety-five percent confidence interval
from the model was ($55.90, $87.81). Thus it is doubtful whether the
strength of the relationships between the rate of adoptions or the ceiling
level and the simulation estimates are an artifact of the simulation
model.
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Thurston (1939) for example devotes 229 pages of his history of the
steam engine to transportation applications and only 40 pages to the
stationary steam engine,
2
Loree's (1929) account of the Hornblower engine at Roosevelt's Soho
Works leaves open the question of whether the engine was still operational
in 1803. It had been reconstructed by Hornblower in 1798.
3
The Woodbury Report provides the basis for Temin's (1966) analysis of
the spread of steam power.
4
The approximate distances we used were 400 miles to Boston, 250m to
New York, 975m to New Orleans, 350m to Cincinnati and 1050m to Kansas
City, Missouri.
With 3 degrees of freedom, -0.81 > r > 0.81 are significant at
the ten percent level, while -0.875 > r > 0.875 are significant at
the five percent level.
According to the various censuses of manufacturers. For example, the
Eighth Census (1865) reported 1,177 manufacturers of steam engines.
While we estimate that more than 25,000 engines were in use by that date.
7
For example the water-rights at Lawrence and Lowell, Mass, were
originally valued at $15,000. The original grantees paid $10,000 down
and interest on the balance at 6 percent, or $300 per mill-power
( 85.23 theoretical h.p.) defined in weight of silver. After the
Civil War mill-powers were leased for $1,200 per year. See Department
of the Interior (1883).
Q
The same, of course, was true of related inventions other than steam.
Water turbine manufacturers, for example, concentrated upon the New
England market after the Appelton Co. at Lowell in 1846 had successfully
installed 3-190 horsepower turbines designed by Uriah Borden (Clark, 1929)
,
This of course was the market where steam power was least profitable.
9
See, for example, Justitla (1849) and De Bow's Review (1853).
For example, the Lawrences as owners of two water powered mills and
of all water-rights in Lawrence, Mass. through the Essex Company had a
very clear motivation. No less clear are the motives for James B. and
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Colonel James Francis support for water, both were separately agents
and engineers for the Locks and Canal Company at Lowell.
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